# Eliminating COVID-19: The New Zealand experience and wider implications

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#### **Previous experienced with 'pandemics**

- HIV/AIDS 1987-91 NEP
- SARS 2003 (minimal impact in NZ)
- Pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009

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• COVID-19 2020



## Outline

- Assessing pandemics
- Strategic choices for pandemic response
- Components of elimination strategy
- Impact of COVID-19 elimination strategy
- Key lessons from COVID-19 response





## **Assessing Pandemics**



#### **Assessing pandemics**

Factors influencing response to pandemics, include:

- **Transmissibility** of pathogen Ro, Reff
- Severity particularly case fatality risk (CFR) & infection fatality risk (IFR)
- Inequalities impact of pandemic & response
- **Controllability** effectiveness of interventions
- Feasibility of response public sector capacity to respond, public acceptability & adherence
- Economics cost of action and inaction, counterfactuals
- **Certainty** availability & quality of information, science capacity, awareness of options, experience/dogma

### **Assessing pandemics**

#### **Estimated mortality from COVID-19 pandemic:**

- Modelled, assuming Ro=2.5, 25% control
- 57% population infected
- Peaks after 5 months 1650 in ICU
- 28,300 hospitalised (0.6% population)
- 12,700 deaths (0.3% population)

= mortality of 25 seasonal influenza seasons

Source: Wilson et al, University of Otago 2020



#### **Assessing pandemics**

#### Mortality rates for Māori vs non-Māori in 3 successive influenza pandemics



Source: Wilson et al 2012, Emerg Infect Dis





Strategic choices for pandemic response: Light-bulb moments

- January 2020 It's a serious global pandemic
- **2. February 2020** It can be contained/eliminated/stopped

**3. March 2020** - NZ is not ready, 'lockdown' needed



Source: Wu et al. Lancet 31 Jan 2020



Source: Aylward et al, WHO, 28 Feb 2020

#### **Strategic Choices for Pandemic Response**

- **Control** Disease rates reduced to an acceptable level
  - Mitigation Manageable levels to avoid overwhelming health care system
  - Suppression Low levels to minimise adverse health effects
- Elimination Disease or infection incidence reduced to zero in a defined area (country or region), eg poliomyelitis, measles, rubella
  - Eradication Infection reduced to zero at a global level, eg smallpox



Source: Dowdle, MMWR Supple. December 1999 / 48 (SU01);23-7

### **Strategic choices: Mitigation**

#### Mitigation

- Pandemic influenza plan
- Aims to 'flatten the peak'
- NZ approach up until mid-March

Figure 1: New Zealand strategic approach to a pandemic



Ministry of Health. 2017. New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Plan: A framework for action (2nd edn). Wellington: Ministry of Health.

#### **Strategic choices: Elimination**

- Developed elimination strategy in Feb-March 2020
- Effectively adopted by NZ Gov on 23 March with decision to go into rapid lockdown with ~100 COVID-19 cases, no deaths

#### New Zealand's elimination strategy for the COVID-19 pandemic and what is required to make it work

Michael G Baker, Amanda Kvalsvig, Ayesha J Verrall, Lucy Telfar-Barnard, Nick Wilson

In this editorial we summarise the threat posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the justification for the elimination strategy adopted by New Zealand, and some of the actions required to maximise the chances of success.

#### What is the size and nature of the threat?

The COVID-19 pandemic, caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, has shown a relentless ability to infect the world's population. The virus is highly infectious, with each case typically infecting 2–3 others (a reproduction number [Ro] of about 2.5). Consequently, it has the potential to infect about 60% (crudely estimated as 1-1/Ro) of the world's population during the next 1–2 ware as endemic world in the text the second secon

the fact that populations take measures to protect themselves.<sup>3</sup> Under one of the more likely scenarios if the country's current elimination strategy fails, New Zealand could expect approximately 14,400 deaths.<sup>3</sup> In addition, large numbers of people who are ill and hospitalised could swamp health services at all levels and prevent the delivery of elective services and prevent the care.

A poorly controlled pandemic will greatly increase health inequities. Like seasonal influenza in New Zealand, risk is particularly concentrated in older people and those with severe comorbidities.<sup>4</sup> Therefore Maori and Pacific peoples could be more vulnerable, as seen in past influenza pandemics.<sup>5</sup>

What are the strategic options?

Source: Baker, Kvalsvig, ... Wilson, NZ Med J, 3 April 2020



### **Components of elimination strategy**

#### Intervention logic for pandemic response strategies



The logic: Stopping the pandemic means reducing the reproduction number (R) to less than 1. The 3 drivers are transmission, contact rate, and duration of infectivity.

Kvalsvig 2020

## **Components of elimination strategy**

#### **1. Exclusion of cases**

• *Keep it out* – Border Management

#### 2. Case and outbreak management

Stamp it out – Testing, contact tracing, isolation/quarantine

#### 3. Reducing transmission

- Reducing transmission per contact Hygiene measures, Masks
- Reducing contacts Physical distancing & travel restrictions

Source: Baker et al 2020, NZ Med J, MJA



#### **Elimination: Border Management**



#### **Elimination: Testing & Contact Tracing**





Swabbing for Covid-19, Wellington, May 2020

#### Source: MoH website



### Elimination: Physical distancing (lockdown)

#### New Zealand COVID-19 Alert Levels Summary

 The Alert Levels are determined by the Government and specify the public health and social measures to be taken in the fight against COVID-19. Further guidance is available on the Covid19.govt.nz website.

- The measures may be updated based on new scientific knowledge about COVID-19, information about the
  effectiveness of control measures in New Zealandan doverseas, or the application of Alert Levels at different
  times (e.g. the application may be different depending on if New Zealand is moving down or up Alert Levels).
- Different parts of the country may be at different Alert Levels. We can move up and down Alert Levels
- Essential services including supermarkets, health services, emergency services, utilities and goods transport will
  continue to operate at any level. Employers in those sectors must continue to meet health and safety obligations.
- Restrictions are cumulative (e.g. at Alert Level 4, all restrictions from Alert Levels1, 2 and 3 apply).

Updated 5 June 2020

Unite against

#### ELIMINATION STRATEGY - New Zealand is working together to eliminate COVID-19

| Alert Level  | RiskAssessment  | Range of Measures (can be applied locally or nationally)  |   |  |  |  |
|--|---|---|---|--|--|--|
| Level 4 – Lockdown<br>Likely the disease<br>is not contained                                       | Communitytransmission<br>is occurring     Wides pread outbreaks<br>and new clusters.  | <ul> <li>People instructed to stay at home in their bubble other than for essential personal movement.</li> <li>Safe recreational activity is allowed in local area.</li> <li>Travel is severely limited.</li> <li>All gatherings cancelled and all public venues closed.</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>Business es dosed exceptiforessentialservices (e.g. supermarkets, pharmacies, clinics, petrol stations) and lifeline utilities.</li> <li>Educational facilities closed.</li> <li>Retioning of supplies and requisitioning of facilities possible.</li> <li>Reprioritisation of healthcare services.</li> </ul>   |  |  |  |
| Level 3 – Restrict<br>High risk the disease<br>is not contained                                    | <ul> <li>Community transmission<br/>might be happ ening.</li> <li>New clusters may emerge<br/>but can be controlled<br/>through testing end<br/>contact tracing.</li> </ul> | People instructed to stayhome in their bubble other than for as sertial personalmovement – including to go to work, school if they have to, or for local recreation.     Physical distancing of two metres outside home (including on public transport), or one matre in controlled environments like schools and workplaces.     People must say within their immediate household bubble, but can expand this to reconnect with dose family / whänau, or bring in caregivers, or support is dated people. This extended bubble should remain exclusive.     Schools (years 1to 10) and Early/Childhood Education certres cans afelyopen, but will have limited capacity. Childhen should learn athome if possible.     People must work from homeunies that is not possible.     Business es can open premises, but cannot physically interact with customers. | <ul> <li>Low risk local recreation activities are allowed.</li> <li>Public venues are closed (e.g. libraries, museums, cinemas, food courts, gyms, pools, pivgrounds, markets).</li> <li>Gatherings of up to 10 people are allowed butonly for wedding services, funerals and tanghanga. Physical distancing and public health measures mus the maintained.</li> <li>Healthcare services use virtual, non-contactcore ultations where possible.</li> <li>Inter-regional travel is highly limited (e.g. for essential workers, with limited exemptions for others).</li> <li>Roople at high risk of severe liness (older people and those with existing medical conditions) are encouraged to stay at home where possible, and take additional precautions when leaving home. They may choose to work.</li> </ul>  |  |  |  |
| Level 2 – Reduce<br>The disease is contained,<br>but the risk of community<br>transmission remains | <ul> <li>Household transmission<br/>could be occurring.</li> <li>Single or is olated cluster<br/>outbreaks.</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>People can reconnect with friends and family, and socialise in groups of up to 100, go shopping, or travel domestically, if following public health guidance.</li> <li>Keep physical distancing of two metrics from people you don't know when out in public for in real stores. Keep onemettre physical distancing in controlled environmentalike workplaces, where practicable.</li> <li>No more than 100 people atgatherings, including weldings, birthdays and fumerals and tanghanga.</li> <li>Business es can open to the public if following public health guidance including physical distancing and record keeping. Alternative ways of working are encouraged where possible.</li> <li>Hos pitality businesses must keep groups of customers separated, seated, and served by a single person. Maximum of 100 people at atime.</li> </ul>    | <ul> <li>Sport and recreation activities are allowed, subject to conditions on getherings, record keeping, and - where practical - physical distancing.</li> <li>Public venues such as museums, libraries and pools can open if they comply with public health measures and ensure timetre physical distancing and record keeping.</li> <li>Event facilities, including chernes, stadiums, concert venues and casinos can have more than 100 people at a time, provided that there are no more than 100 in a defined space, and the groups do not mix.</li> <li>Health and disability care services operate as normally as possible.</li> <li>It is safe to send your children to schools, early learning services and tertiary education. There will be appropriate measures in place.</li> <li>People at higher-risk of severe illness from COV ID-19 (e.g. those with underlying medical conditions, especially if not well-controlled, and seniority are encouraged to take additional precoutions when leaving them. They may work, if they agree with their employer that they can do so safely.</li> </ul> |  |  |  |
| Level 1 – Prepare<br>The disease is contained<br>in New Zealand                                    | COVID-19 is uncontrolled<br>oversees.     Isolated ho usehold<br>transmission could be<br>occurring in New Zealand.   | Border entrymeasures to minimise risk of imp onting COVID-19 cases.     Intensive testingfor COVID-19.     Rapid contact tracing of any positive case.     Self-is diation and quarantine required.     Schools and workplaces open, and must operate safely.     No restrictions on personal movement but people are encouraged to maintain arecord of where they have been.   | <ul> <li>No restrictions on gatherings but organisers encouraged to maintain records to enable contacttracing.</li> <li>Stay home if you'reaick, reportflu-like symptoms.</li> <li>Wash and dryhands, cough into elbow, dorftbuch your face.</li> <li>No restrictions on domestic triansport – avoid public triansport or travel if sick.</li> <li>No restrictions on work places or services but they are encouraged to maintain records to enable contact tracing.</li> </ul>   |  |  |  |



## Elimination: Physical distancing (lockdown)

COVID-19: Government Response Stringency Index



Source: Hale, Webster, Petherick, Phillips, and Kira (2020). Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker – Last updated 5 August, 01:30 (London time)

Note: This index simply records the number and strictness of government policies, and should not be interpreted as 'scoring' the appropriateness or effectiveness of a country's response.

OurWorldInData.org/coronavirus • CC BY



Our World in Data



Main motorway into Wellington, Alert Level 4, May 2020



## Impact of Elimination Strategy

Source: Baker, Wilson, Anglemyer. NEJM e56 DOI: 202010.1056/NEJMc2025203



#### **Components of elimination strategy** Resurgence planning & management

- New extended cluster detected in Auckland 11 August
- 179 cases with same genome lineage
- Rapid response including:
  - High levels of testing & contact tracing
  - Alert levels 3 (Auck), 2 (Rest of NZ)
  - Mass masking on public transport
- Now eliminated





#### Impact of Elimination Strategy Death rate from COVID-19, OECD countries



#### Impact of Elimination Strategy Near elimination of seasonal influenza





Source: Huang, ESR, Oct 2020

#### **Impact of Elimination Strategy**

|  | Country/     | Pop-ulation      | GDP change in      |                   | Cum-ulative       | Case rate (per   | Cum-ulative     | COVID-19 mortality rate |  |  |
|--|--------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|--|--|
| Region   | Jurisdiction | (millions)       | Q2*                | Peak string-ency  | COVID-19 cases    | million)         | COVID-19 deaths | (per million)           |  |  |
| European and North American countries with population >10 million                  |              |                  |                    |                   |                   |                  |                 |                         |  |  |
| Europe   | Germany      | 84.0             | -9.7               | 76.9              | 283,706           | 3384             | 9530            | 114                     |  |  |
| Europe   | France       | 65.3             | -13.8              | 88.0              | 513,034           | 7856             | 31,459          | 485                     |  |  |
| Europe   | UK           | 68.0             | -20.4              | 79.6              | 423,236           | 6227             | 41,936          | 617                     |  |  |
| Europe   | Italy        | 60.5             | -12.8              | 93.5              | 306,235           | 5067             | 35,801          | 592                     |  |  |
| Europe   | Spain        | 46.8             | -17.8              | 85.2              | 735,198           | 15,723           | 31,232          | 668                     |  |  |
| Europe   | Ukraine      | 43.7             | -11.4              | 88.9              | 191,671           | 4389             | 3827            | 88                      |  |  |
| Europe   | Poland       | 37.8             | -8.9               | 83.3              | 84,396            | 2231             | 2392            | 63                      |  |  |
| Europe   | Romania      | 19.2             | -12.3              | 87.0              | 119,683           | 6231             | 4633            | 241                     |  |  |
| Europe   | Netherlands  | 17.1             | -8.5               | 79.6              | 105,918           | 6178             | 6328            | 369                     |  |  |
| Europe   | Belgium      | 11.6             | -12.1              | 81.5              | 108,768           | 9375             | 9965            | 859                     |  |  |
| Europe   | Greece       | 10.4             | -14.1              | 84.3              | 16,913            | 1625             | 369             | 35                      |  |  |
| Europe   | Czechia      | 10.7             | -8.7               | 82.4              | 61,318            | 5723             | 581             | 54                      |  |  |
| Europe   | Sweden       | 10.1             | -8.3               | 46.3              | 90,923            | 8990             | 5880            | 581                     |  |  |
| Europe   | Portugal     | 10.2             | -13.9              | 88.0              | 72,055            | 7071             | 1936            | 190                     |  |  |
| N. America   | USA          | 331.0            | -9.1               | 72.7              | 7,236,369         | 21,832           | 208,369         | 629                     |  |  |
| N. America   | Canada       | 37.7             | -11.5              | 74.5              | 150,456           | 3978             | 9255            | 245                     |  |  |
| East Asian and Australasian countries with population >10million, plus New Zealand |              |                  |                    |                   |                   |                  |                 |                         |  |  |
| East Asia  | China        | 1427.6           | +11.5              | 81.9              | 85,322            | 59               | 4634            | 3                       |  |  |
| East Asia  | Japan        | 127.2            | -7.9               | 47.2              | 80,497            | 637              | 1532            | 12                      |  |  |
| East Asia  | North Korea  | 25.5             | NA                 | NA                | NA                | NA               | NA              | NA                      |  |  |
| East Asia  | South Korea  | 51.2             | -3.2               | 82.4              | 23,345            | 457              | 395             | 8                       |  |  |
| East Asia  | Taiwan       | 23.7             | -0.7               | 30.6              | 509               | 21               | 7               | 0.3                     |  |  |
| Australasia  | Australia    | 25.5             | -7.0               | 79.2              | 27,000            | 1056             | 869             | 34                      |  |  |
| Australasia  | New Zealand  | <mark>4.8</mark> | <mark>-12.2</mark> | <mark>96.3</mark> | <mark>1829</mark> | <mark>366</mark> | 25              | 5                       |  |  |

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#### **Effective Science + Good Political Leadership**



#### C This article is more than 2 months old conversation Five ways New Zealand can keep Covid-19 Coronavirus outbreak cases at zero Modelling shows it is very likely New Zealand has eliminated Michael Baker coronavirus. Keeping it that way is the next big challenge and Nick Wilson Coronavirus - latest updates Mon 8 Jun 2020 04.02 BST • See all our coronavirus coverage M 308 205

#### Institutional lessons

- 1. Elimination of COVID-19 **benefits health & economy** compared with alternatives
- 2. Effective **risk assessment & strategic decision making** is important in public health crises
- 3. Consider **equity and partnerships** with affected communities
- 4. Need to **strengthen public health infrastructure** for this and future crises
- 5. Need to strengthen and **reform global health agencies** like WHO

# Improved decision-making frameworks eg, that can manage diverse range of pandemic threats



Opportunity for **broad 'reset'** and increased focus on managing major global health threats



## Summary

Importance of Effective
 Science + Good Political
 Leadership, with high quality risk assessment &
 rapid, decisive response



- NZ choice of elimination likely to protect health & economy > than alternative strategies
- Opportunity to **strengthen public health capacity**
- Opportunity for major reset towards a more equitable & sustainable society



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- Based at the University of Otago, multiple collaborations
- Director: Michael Baker, Lead Researchers: Amanda Kvalsvig, Nick Wilson
- Goal: To support an effective and equitable pandemic response
- Researchers from Universities (x3), CRI, Community group









• Funding from HRC, philanthropic organisations, Universities





ESS • PARTICIPATION • INSPIRATION





## **Follow-up**

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